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Abstract 
 
Science is dependent on standardised rodents. These lab-rats and lab-mice are different 
from their wild cousins. Interest in the genetic basis of a variety of phenotypes has 
meant that lab-rodents have been bred over many decades as resources for 
experimental science. We focus on the use of lab-rodents as animal models in the 
study of single-gene human medical conditions. The animals’ status as models is not a 
given. Scientists calibrate animals against the medical phenomena which they are 
intended to represent. In turn, human medical conditions and the patients who manifest 
them have to be calibrated against the rodent models. The creation of animal models 
and their interpretation is, therefore, part of the practical work of biomedical scientists 
and their adjustment is a key aspect in determining when the model is good-enough. 
 
Introduction 
 
We document the work of biomedical scientists in using rodent models of human 
diseases for single-gene disorders. We illustrate the work of choosing animal models 
to represent human medical phenomena, and of making those medical conditions, in 
turn, fit the models.  The choice of species and the calibration of models are, therefore, 
fundamental aspects of the practical work conducted by biomedical scientists, as is the 
determination that any given model is good-enough. The notion of ‘good-enough’ in 
the social sciences derives, in part, from the work of Winnicott (1953) and has 
subsequently been applied to a wide number of phenomena, in management for 
instance being related to the Pareto Principle: diminishing returns mean that striving 
for perfection is self-defeating.  It is also used in systems engineering and software 
development to describe a level of representation adequate for functionality, and is 
widely used in discussions of scientific measurement. Our own use here derives more 
from the phenomenological tradition, especially the work of Alfred Schütz (1967), to 
capture the practical work of deciding how and when a representation is deemed 
adequate for the users’ interests-at-hand.  
 
All forms of research involve a type of simplification and representation. Delamont, 
Atkinson and Parry (2000) show how research fields - from anthropology to 
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biochemistry, to artificial intelligence - are ‘predicated on particular ways of 
establishing conventional representation and simplifications’ (p114). Modelling, in 
particular, is a type of simplification and representation intrinsic to experimentation, 
and animal modelling is a particular form that plays a fundamental role in the 
biomedical disciplines.  
Mice, rats and zebrafish account for over 90% of the animals used as models in 
biomedical research.  Laboratory-rodents include transgenic mice (where DNA from 
an organism has been inserted into the embryo), knock-out and knock-in rodents 
(where a specific gene has been removed from or inserted into the animal) and animals 
with surgical lesions. These lab-rodents are among a wide range of contemporary bio-
objects: organisms and assemblages that transform boundaries between species, 
between the human and the non-human, and between the organic and non-organic 
(Vermeulen, Tamminen and Webster 2012). Transgenic rodents are part natural, part 
artificially created (Holmberg and Ideland 2009, 2012; Shapiro 2002). They are 
‘progressively transformed from holistic naturalistic creatures into analytical objects of 
technical investigation’ (Lynch 1988: 266). They are, as Michael (2001) suggests, 
‘bespoke’ organisms. Such transformation requires work and interpretation on the part 
of laboratory scientists. 
There have been animal ‘models’ of the human and the social in many cultural and 
historical contexts. Fable and folklore have used exemplary animal species to ‘model’ 
human social behaviour: for example the anthropomorphising of the industrious bee or 
ant, the wise owl and the cunning fox. They are all illustrative of the ways in which we 
take animals to be essentially like humans despite differences (Daston and Mitman 
2005). The pervasive phenomenon of totemic species represents another way in which 
natural kinds can be used as metaphors whereby social and cultural categories have 
their homologies in the natural world (Lévi-Strauss 1963). Likewise, Ritvo (1987) 
documents culturally-defined homologies between social status and animal pedigrees.  
 
Contemporary animal models are used in medical research to create a distinctive form 
of correspondence. They are used to represent distinctive features of human medical 
conditions. As we shall see, they cannot do so in every possible detail, and there are 
often trade-offs between functional value and representational detail. Laboratory 
rodents are, therefore, simultaneously like and unlike their human counterparts, as are 
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the manifestations of illness, produced by genetic manipulation or surgically-induced 
lesions. They are part of a constellation of biomedical phenomena that bring human 
and animal domains into alignment (cf Agamben 2004; Haraway 1997; Brown and 
Michael 2004; Birke, Arluke and Michael 2007).  
 
Methods 
The paper derives from three projects examining the scientific and medical work 
within stem cell laboratories and clinical genetics services. Animal modelling is 
fundamental to the practical work at all these sites. First, we draw on observation and 
interviews at a laboratory we call Cell-lab, conducting experimental foetal tissue 
research into Huntington’s and Parkinson’s disease (Author 1). Second, the paper 
draws on observations and interviews at four research centres focussing on stem cell 
treatments, which we call TransLab (Author 3). Third, the paper draws on an 
ethnographic study of Rett Syndrome documenting multiple sites where it is enacted 
and represented (Author 4).  Fieldwork at the research sites was conducted between 
2006 and 2010.  Author 1 spent six months with research technicians, and cell and 
behavioural scientists in an animal house observing the performance of behavioural 
tasks on laboratory-rodents. Author 3 spent varying periods of up to three weeks over 
four years observing and interviewing stem cell scientists, clinicians and animal 
welfare officers. Author 4 spent eighteen months carrying out ethnographic fieldwork 
following a local clinical and scientific team and the wider scientific field at 
international conferences. Interview data from the three sites were transcribed and 
analysed, while fieldnotes were written-up immediately following observations of 
laboratories, clinics, and conferences. All data-sets have been analysed thematically, 
and are the basis of publications elsewhere (Harrington and Stephens 2010; 
Featherstone and Atkinson 2011; Lewis and Atkinson 2011; Stephens, Lewis and 
Atkinson in press). Our analytic aim here is to draw out a generic account of themes 
that have been identified across the various research sites dealing with the good-
enough model.  
 
Models 
A model, by definition, in order to function as a model, must preserve some essential 
features of the original, while discarding or simplifying others. If not, it will expand to 
encompass the same degree of detail as the original. It would be like the map described 
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by Borges (1988). The map-maker progressively incorporated features until the map 
grew to the same size as the original territory rendering it functionally useless. 
Modelling implies a number of activities or functions: models simplify, they 
standardise, and they stand proxy for other objects. Animal models do all of these 
things – substituting for human actors, embodying selected biological and medical 
traits in standardised and manageable ways, and being among several versions or 
representations of disease entities. Models can vary depending on the number of 
features they mimic and what they omit, each being a gloss on the original (Garfinkel 
and Sacks 1970). Simplified representations are often preferred over more detailed 
versions for the purposes of scientific presentation (Mulkay and Gilbert 1984) and 
complex data are routinely broken down in order to render them tractable (Star 1983). 
Furthermore, models embody the practices of framing and answering scientific 
questions (Fox-Keller 2000). 
 
In biomedicine, ‘model’ has two connotations. On the one hand, the biomedical 
communities we study refer to laboratory animals as ‘models’. This is what might be 
called the bio-object. Analytically speaking, on the other hand, we can identify a much 
broader, generic process whereby representations are constructed and circulated. These 
can take many concrete forms – from laboratory animals, to photographs and video-
recordings, to statistical representations, to graphic representations, and so on. The 
latter are all ‘models’ in the broader sense.  
 
Our general contention is that the power of any given model - in whatever material 
embodiment - is not a given. There is no natural set of representations or equivalences 
that confers the status of model. Models need to be achieved. Their representational 
capacities have to be worked at continually. The degree of correspondence needs 
calibrating and adjusting in the course of everyday laboratory work. Human medical 
conditions and versions of them in rodents are no different in this respect. They too 
require alignment through such work and through professional judgments of adequacy 
including deciding when the model is good-enough. 
 
Choosing and Calibrating Animals 
First, scientists need to consider what species to use.  When considering the 
‘appropriate material’, the modeler must ask: what is the model’s function – for 
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example to map a particular biological pathway or to mirror a human disease? Which 
animal is then best suited to achieve this and is the animal practically and morally 
viable for use in experimentation? Indeed, the decision over which animals should be 
used in experimentation has had an awkward and often controversial history, 
encouraging ethical as well as biological debates (French 1975; Knight 2011). For 
example, when deciding what constitutes an animal in the laboratory there may be 
distinctions drawn between vertebrate and invertebrate species; such demarcation lines 
are entangled with emotional, ethical and cultural values as well as scientific ones 
(Paton 1984).  
 
In the laboratory, a stable hierarchy and menagerie of species has emerged, including 
yeast, worm, fly, mouse, rat, through to monkey and chimpanzee. This scale reflects 
the complexity of the organism, the amount of DNA shared with humans, as well as 
more elementary characteristics such as the size of organs and speed of reproduction. 
Once made, the choice of species, in turn, implies investment in infrastructure, and 
commitment to an array of specific experimental techniques and expertise. Paton 
(1984) reports, it was towards the beginning of the twentieth century that rodents 
emerged as the most common subject for experimentation. The appearance of the 
mouse, for example, has been traced back to C.C. Little’s research into cancer and 
genetics (Radar 1998; 2004); while Clause (1993) tells a similar story about the 
standardization of the Wistar rat. Endersby (2007) discusses the significance of the two 
rodent species, which have become standard animal-models for biomedical research. 
They are used to display the molecular basis of many human diseases and enable 
proof-of-principle studies for novel diagnostic and treatment strategies (cf. Wanga et 
al. 2005; Davis et al. 1998).  Although animal models are artefacts designed to be 
shared across scientific communities and are often referred to as boundary objects 
(Star and Griesemer 1989), boundary walkers (Haraway 1997), or boundary crawlers 
(Holmberg and Ideland 2009), the specific features of each model have become 
associated with distinct fields of biomedical science. Research groups have therefore 
been known to align and identify themselves with particular animal models (Kohler 
1994). Accordingly, each species has large-scale, international, scientific communities 
attached to them.  
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Next, a research group must decide whether an animal-model achieves a good enough 
equivalence to their target medical condition: whether it will develop a symptom or 
disease or respond adequately to treatment. There is always, in principle, the practical 
problem for the model user: How ‘good’ is a good-enough animal model? How many 
of the original features of the human disease must be preserved? How many functions 
need to be implemented in the design? How reliable does the model need to be to 
work? In other words, the adequacy and fidelity of any model must be judged.   
 
Two dimensions are therefore involved in animal modelling. First, there is the vertical 
dimension: that is, the choice of animal species for the model. This reflects degrees of 
general similarity to humans, from the simplest organisms such as yeasts to more 
complex organisms such as primates. For example, Brown and Michael (2001) discuss 
scientists’ discursive work in establishing the position of pigs within such a calculus of 
comparison with humans. This vertical axis also reflects pragmatic issues, such as the 
ease of breeding laboratory populations and the infrastructure they require. Indeed, the 
vertical axis represents a series of similarities and differences between species that 
corresponds to the process of replacement or transposition (Friese and Clarke 2012). 
Second, there is the ‘horizontal’ dimension; that is, the axis of similarity to a specific 
medical condition or symptom that can be achieved. The horizontal axis represents the 
processes whereby particular populations or even individual animals are matched to 
selected features of the target medical condition. We argue that the vertical axis 
represents relationships of a metaphorical nature (based on difference, separation and 
substitution), while the horizontal axis represents relationships of a metonymic kind, 
(based on selected affinities). The latter, we maintain, depends on processes of 
calibrationi: the iterative adjustment of the rodent model and the disease-model to 
bring them into alignment for the purposes of practical experimentation. In the rest of 
the paper we use empirical data to example how the metaphorical and metonymic are 
intertwined in the process of making the good-enough model. 
 
Rodents as Standard 
As already indicated, the choice of species is the first decision to be made. Mouse and 
rat currently sit in that good enough space to satisfy a Darwinian inspired evolutionary 
resemblance to humans (warm blooded mammals with a close enough genetic 
affinity), whilst are also arguably ethically less problematic than other possible 
 7 
candidates (e.g. ape, or the domesticated cat or dog). That is, mouse and rat are both 
similar to and different enough from humans to have emerged as the marquee animals 
for use in experimentation. These similarities and differences combined with their 
experimental amenability make rodents functional experimental animals, although they 
cannot replicate various kinds of human functions, such as higher cognitive processes, 
language, or bipedal posture and gait.  
 
Rats and mice – rodents that embody the instrumentation of modern genetics - are both 
used in the biomedical research reported here. The two standard species co-exist, in 
part, because different scientific communities (molecular biology and behavioural 
studies) currently work together under the domain of translational research. Two clear 
examples of this are research into Huntington’s disease (HD) and Rett syndrome 
(RTT).  
 
HD is a dominantly inherited, degenerative neurological condition characterised by 
complex phenotypic behavioral and neurological features, which cause involuntary 
twitching and chronic jerky uncontrollable movements, leading to complete disability, 
cognitive impairment and dementia. In the world of molecular and histological 
research on HD, the mouse is the material of choice as it can be manipulated to be 
representative of the human HD gene. In the following quote Dr Greenii explains how 
the mouse is the superior model for the sequence of nucleotides CAG:  
 
‘The whole genetics behind it is [different]. They could only get, I think, 50 
CAG repeats into the rat... In Huntington’s there’s up to 120 CAG repeats or 
something but they couldn’t get anything high. Whereas with mice you can get 
various lengths of CAG repeats’ [Dr Green: Cell-lab]. 
 
Dr Green’s comments are representative of the wider field of transgenic animals. The 
genetic engineering of animals – with the exception of mice - has been a rather slow 
process requiring large financial investment. As she explains, within HD research they 
have not been able to create a transgenic rat with high enough CAG repeats and this 
renders it a poor genetic model compared to the mouse.  
 
Further exploration of HD research, however, reveals that if the behavioral features of 
the condition are the focus, then the rat becomes the experimenter’s preferred rodent. 
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When asked therefore to justify why the laboratory uses both rats and mice, the 
response was:  
 
‘Because you’ve got different flexibilities in each.  So in mice it is much easier 
to make transgenics [for Huntington’s]…The reason for using rats is that they 
are much better at doing animal behavior - really substantially better - so if 
you’re looking at complex behaviors that are maybe more akin to human 
behavior, then you’re much better off with a rat.  It’s also got a bigger brain, so 
you know if you’re doing transplantations… it’s much easier, the bigger the 
brain the easier it is to do those sorts of experiments’ [Prof Stephens: Cell-lab].   
 
Professor Stephens’ comment provides us with confirmation that the mouse is easier to 
manipulate at the genetic level and, likewise, that the rat is the preferred model to 
study complex behavior: rats perform experimental tasks more willingly and 
demonstrate a range of behaviors that are perceived to be more ‘akin’ to human 
behavior. Rats also have larger brains, which mean surgical modifications such as 
inserting therapeutic grafts are easier to perform. She uses the term ‘flexibilities’ to 
describe how each animal (even those animals from the same order of species) and 
therefore each model has its advantages and disadvantages.  
 
A colleague elaborates further on the relationships between mouse and rat.  
Corroborating the previous two extracts she explains that mice are ‘easier’ to 
manipulate at a molecular level. She goes further, however, explaining that although 
this delicacy and intricacy is valued within molecular biology, these same ‘traits’ mean 
that they are not always robust enough for behavioural experimentation, particularly in 
comparison to the more gregarious rat. 
  
‘Mice were generated first because it's easier to generate a [transgenic] model 
in a mouse…  But mice are not as easy to test with because they're a bit 
temperamental and they have a habit of just dying…  Rats are a bit more 
robust.  I'm a bit mouseist because I'm allergic to them, but rats are just 
generally more robust animals and they have less tendency to being nervous 
about being handled and less tendency to just keel over and die’ [Dr Dunbar: 
Cell-lab]. 
 
Dr Dunbar aligns herself with rats, claiming that they are more sturdy and comfortable 
around humans than mice. Nevertheless she recognises the history of the mouse-model 
and it is clear that the laboratory use both animals. Therefore when it comes to 
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calibrating the choice of animal to the human disease, different scientific groups value 
different animals. Species alignment is based on local preferences. 
 
A particular species may become associated with a disease, or a specific feature of that 
disease. For example, it would appear that the transgenic mouse has a closer genetic 
affinity to human HD, while the rat with a lesion provides a better imitation of human 
HD behaviour. The global choice of species used to stand in place for the human 
(metaphorical relations) therefore has to be matched with local laboratory expertise. 
Scientists endeavour to calibrate particular features of the animal against different 
features of the medical condition (metonymic relations).   
 
There are, of course, other practical reasons for using rats as models over and above 
any behavioral equivalence to humans. Although significantly larger than the mouse, 
the rat is still a smaller and cheaper option compared to other mammalian candidates.  
Larger mammals tend to live longer and, as such, might mirror the human lifecourse or 
disease trajectory more faithfully. However smaller mammals with a shorter life-cycle 
such as the rat are considered to be more in harmony with the temporal rhythms of 
experimentation and research, an exemplar of how models are situated in particular 
worlds and judged through different lenses and temporal frames. Therefore what 
makes a model good enough is dependent on which attributes are prioritised and 
valued, and by whom. In terms of biological resemblance it might be argued that a 
primate would be a better model, but in terms of experimental practicalities (which 
include regulatory barriers, facilities, methods, resources and infrastructures) the rat 
may be considered to be a better option as the following quote indicates: 
 
‘You’ve got to look at the whole disease and then you’ve also got to look at 
how we can represent that disease to perhaps try to find strategies to alter the 
disease progress.  In terms of what's available for testing for example, arguably, 
a primate would be much better… to use to model human disease.  But, of 
course, primates are very expensive, you can't use many of them, there's lots of 
legal implications, there's lots of social implications…so we have to find other 
models and so we use the rat.  Rats are very cheap, you can produce lots of 
them, they’re in common use.  Socially there's less of a problem than with 
primates’ [Dr Grant: Cell-lab]. 
 
The claim from Dr Grant is not that the mouse and rat are [necessarily] the best 
candidates for biological imitation, but that any decision is also bound up in ethical, 
social, cultural and institutional judgments. The choice of mouse or rat may reflect 
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their ready availability just as much as any special suitability. To state that ‘there we 
are, so we have to find other models and so we use rat’ is to suggest that rodents are 
good enough because they are made to be.  
 
Models for Particular Purposes 
As we have already suggested, rodents need to be aligned, or calibrated, with the 
selected features of the human medical condition. In the case of HD there is no single 
rodent-model but a proliferation of models within models, each representing a smaller 
or a larger array of symptoms. Models can be matched to a particular feature of a 
disease or biological pathway. In Professor Stephens’ work examining the 
effectiveness of inserting therapeutic grafts into the brains of rats, the rat with a 
surgical lesion provides a stable model adapted to experimental requirements.  
 
‘If you have more models and if you understand fully the complexities of those 
models then it gives you more options as to match the therapeutics up to that 
model.  That’s the big advantage.  For example lesion-models are probably not 
very good for therapeutics but they’re ideal for testing very quickly whether your 
grafts are going to work rather than waiting for an animal to get to two years old 
before you sacrifice it and see whether your grafts have survived or not, which is 
an issue that we have’ [Professor Stephens: Cell-lab]. 
Rather than having to keep models alive for extended periods, with all the associated 
staff and resources costs, the lesion-rat model provides reliable and speedy results. The 
global choices of which animal to use are, however, influenced heavily by local 
practices, local traditions and local expertise. The following example describes the 
close alignment of Cell-lab with the mouse-model. The team has been using mice-
models for a long time, and they exude a sense of comfort with this locally understood 
model. 
 
 ‘The mouse-model has been around for a long time and so people just use 
what's available.  The rat-model is quite new and certainly new to our group.  
We've had it for three years now… I mean each model has got its own 
characteristics.  Like for example one model will have lots of histology and 
others will have lots of behavioural problems.  So, if you want to test, if you 
want to do lots of histology we’ll do one model, if you want to do lots of 
behavioural stuff you would try another model’ [Mr Edwards: Cell-lab]. 
 
The good-enough animal is therefore the most practical animal: the one that is 
available, known and understood by experts within the particular laboratory. The 
practical reality is that at the bench there is not an abundance of models to choose 
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from, and researchers are often guided but sometimes constrainediii by the historical 
and institutional tendencies of their laboratory. 
 
Anthropomorphising and Evidential Visibility 
As described, the model animal is calibrated against the target phenomenon. In other 
words, scientists are always faced with the issue of how good a fit the model is. In 
research on human medical conditions, this depends on adjudicating how well the 
animal model replicates the desired human characteristics. Here, we see a process of 
anthropomorphising taking place.  
 
 ‘You can train them very well. They have paws which when you look closely 
at them, they’re not too dissimilar to hands you know?’ [Dr Grant: Cell-lab]. 
 
This relationship and equivalence between paw and hand is used to demonstrate the 
jerky, uncontrollable movements associated with HD. The same process of 
equivalence can be demonstrated in mouse-models of Rett Syndrome (RTT); a severe 
neuro-developmental disorder causing profound intellectual and physical disability, 
particularly in females. Linked with mutations in the MECP2 gene (Amir et al. 1999), 
a range of mouse-models of RTT have been built without functional MeCP2 (Chen et 
al. 2001; Guy et al. 2001; Shahbazian et al. 2002; Pelka et al. 2006). The MeCP2 
deficient mice typically have a stunted body and small brain, develop tremors, and 
suffer from hind limb clasping, and irregular breathing, usually dying 6-12 weeks after 
birth (Chen et al. 2001; Guy et al. 2001). Phenotypically it is described as having 
similar features to children with RTT and therefore demonstration of the mouse-model 
is central to many conference papers delivered on the subject.  
 
A particularly strident version of this relationship was given by one of the leading 
scientists in the field who had created one of the first and most widely used mouse-
models. During her paper, she pronounced that the phenotypic presentation of her 
mouse-model and the human ‘are the same’. To demonstrate this point she played a 
video of a tiny mouse in a cage; its whole body shaking uncontrollably. She described 
this mouse as displaying some of the key features of RTT in a child; the ‘paw 
clasping’ represented hand stereotypies (repetitive, purposeless actions) and the 
uncontrollable shaking a sign of epilepsy: 
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‘The mouse and human phenotypes are the same, they are normal at 2-3 
months, then they display fore paw clasping, and bite when handled and they 
can be more severe and have seizures’ [Fieldnotes]. 
 
However, what constitutes the key clinical features of RTT appears to be modified in 
this context. Whilst ‘hand stereotypies’ is a central clinical feature of the syndrome, 
breathing irregularities, epilepsy or EEG abnormalities are supportive features and are 
not central to a diagnosis of classic RTT (Rett Syndrome Working Group, 1988). In 
the mouse-model described above though the pronounced physical features displayed 
become the syndrome. The mouse’s paw-clasping and uncontrollable shaking is said to 
reveal the inner molecular change and the key physical signs of the syndrome: 
 
‘Why Retts? Well we have mice, it has symptoms which can be expressed in 
the mouse e.g. seizures, abnormal gate, breathing. So not only at a cellular 
level in the brain but also physically- seizures, altered gait- it’s got the 
phenotype as well’ [Fieldnotes].  
 
Furthermore, returning to the example of the HD mouse, the relationship between 
rodent-paw and human-hand changes in the context of touch. Contrary to the close 
association made between paw and hand, in an earlier discussion, a research technician 
at Cell-lab explained the function of the rat’s tongue is to feel and touch, doing some 
of the jobs of human hands. 
 
‘Rats can feel and touch and search for food with their tongues. They have 
remarkably sensitive tongues’ [Fieldnotes]. 
 
It would therefore appear that the anthropomorphising of human traits can be selective 
depending on what scientists want to see, with some features selected whilst others are 
ignored. Nevertheless, a model appears to be deemed good-enough when it provides 
evidential visibility of a condition or disorder. As Mr. Edwards states, the model needs 
to ‘mirror’ the human disease within a particular social world to become good-enough.  
 
‘Unless it mirrors human disease then your strategies [for] checking it aren't 
very good.  I mean that’s from a behavioral point of view, you may look at the 
histology and if the histology mirrors human disease you may want to use 
strategies to alter the histology.  But, from my point of view my projects are 
primarily behavioural.  So it becomes good-enough when the rat starts looking 
like somebody with Huntington’s’ [Mr Edwards: Cell-lab]. 
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Fundamentally, biomedical scientists need to decide how faithfully the mouse 
replicates standard features found in the human, and these can occur on multiple 
levels:  
 
‘Well you have to look at your model on different levels.  You have to look at 
whether it mimics the pathology of the disease, whether it mimics the 
behavioral and the cognitive aspects of the disease and whether when you try 
and treat it, it reduces the deficits that you had before.  If it produces the right 
deficits…if it has the correct pathology and all that kind of thing and they all 
add in together, then you say “oh, that's a good model”’ [Ms Whaling: Cell-
lab].   
 
 
As is explained in the extract, the model ‘needs to be viewed from various levels’ or, 
as we maintain, viewed both vertically (metaphorically) and horizontally (metonymic). 
Taken together the model is therefore made to work through evidential visibility. 
 
Making the Model Work: Creating Real-Life Scenarios 
In the laboratory, animals are also linked to the human by connecting the ways in 
which the model responds to stimuli and the ways in which the disease responds to 
experimental interventions. Returning to the field of HD, the quote below captures 
how lesion-rats mirror some phenotypic aspects of the human disease. It suggests 
experimental findings indicate that ‘stimulated’ rats have better functional recovery 
than those who have little or no stimulation, and likens this to the work of a 
physiotherapist treating and ‘stimulating’ patients with HD. In making this connection, 
the translation from the impact of stimuli on models to clinical interventions is 
forcefully made: 
  
‘One of the post-docs here, who recently left, did a lot of work on 
environmental enrichment… He basically put…one set of rats into a cage 
where they didn’t have much stimulation and a set of rats where there are lots 
of things to play with, you see that there's sort of best functional recovery in the 
ones where they're sort of stimulated.  That could be translated to the real 
world, like for example a physio could have some intervention where she's sort 
of stimulating patients.  So you sort of see parallels there’ [Dr Harris: Cell-lab]. 
 
Here the laboratory and the clinic are drawn closer together as behavioral scientists 
endeavour to replicate clinical interventions. On occasions equivalence is therefore not 
just found in the bio-objects created in the laboratory but also in the surrounding 
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milieu, since in targeted experiments the good-enough model also includes an 
adjustment of the animal’s surroundings.  
 
As described above, the use of a model depends on practical judgments about which 
features of the disease can be expressed and manipulated in the model and which 
aspects can be left out. It also depends on the practical work of simply making the 
experiment work (cf. Fujimura 1988). This is always about practical local decision 
making on the part of the scientists. Personal choices, local compromises and 
imperfections are therefore necessary trade-offs when choosing which models to work 
with. As Dr Grant suggests, research communities have to make do with the best 
model or good-enough model currently available. As an example, he compares the use 
of pig, which is said to more closely resemble the human in size, physiology and 
anatomy, with rats and mice:  
 
 ‘If you want to take pigs to human disease you’ve got to test your strategies. 
What sounds like a really good idea initially doesn’t turn out to be. So the 
advantage of using the rat is, as we said really, [they are] cheap to use and 
[there’s] lots of them. And they work quite well…It is just an indicator that the 
models [we have], perhaps, don’t represent the human disease as well as you 
would want. But, you know it’s the best that we’ve got really’ [Dr Grant: Cell-
lab]. 
 
Dr Grant explains how the HD model does not represent the disease as well as he 
would like. Consequently, scientists continue to model different features of HD, 
suggesting there is unlikely to be a perfect model. It is therefore clear that it is not just 
the fidelity of the mouse in representing the human ‘in general’ that is at issue (the 
metaphorical relationship) but also the extent to which the simulation of ‘the disease’ 
or symptom is a good enough one (metonymic relationship). 
 
The training of rodents by laboratory technicians to perform behavioral tasks for 
experimental research is paramount to this process. In addition to the practical 
problems of description and measurement already discussed, deviant cases and outliers 
must also be managed. The removal of outliers can be troublesome for technicians and 
scientists. For example, at what point should they remove what they consider to be an 
under or over performing mouse from an experiment? Furthermore, to what extent can 
the under/over performance be explained by the manipulation of the gene (the disease) 
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or by an uncooperative animal? Here the rodent is reintroduced into the situation as an 
animal as well as some abstraction of a disease. 
 
‘How are they trained?   Actually they're quite good in that they do learn very 
quickly.  For a situation such as the balance beam where it's on a slope, you put 
them at the bottom of the slope, it seems mice naturally go upwards.  So they'll 
just turn round and they'll walk upwards and then, to encourage them, you put a 
cage mate at the top so they've got something to go to...  Rotor rod you just do - 
gradually build up the speed.  They get it very quickly.  Whereas water maze, I 
don't actually teach them to swim but you kind of dip them in the water… You 
sit them on a platform which is out of the water and with a big flag on it and 
you kind of dip them at the side of the platform so they go straight to the 
platform because they see the flag.  You just encourage them to swim further 
and further away very slowly, and if they do panic, take them out, give them a 
bit of a dry and then try again, slowly’ [Ms Johnson: Cell-lab]. 
 
To model is also to control and make uniform. There is however a long-standing 
tension between the desire to mechanise and standardise and the individual 
specificities of animal care.  Standardisation is an attempt to remove local variations 
from modern science (Birke, Arluke and Michael 2007). Nevertheless, during the pilot 
stage of each test, local decisions are made on the aptitude and ability of particular 
animals to perform the tasks; if classified as unfit, animals may be rested from an 
experimental practice or taken out of the study altogether.  
 
‘If I started testing a mouse in water maze and it wasn't doing very well 
compared to what it normally does, I may stop it after four trials in that day's 
data, feed it up and then start it again the next day.  So I guess, in the end, I'll 
probably just delete all the mouse's data because it obviously wasn't right in the 
first place or things like that.  But I don't think I've ever been in a situation 
where I've actually needed to do that really, just like a couple of times. You 
obviously get the odd mouse that's died during the evening or something… I 
don't think it ever really makes a difference to the results.  I've never known a 
mouse that's freaked out enough to not give good results, if that makes sense’ 
[Ms Johnson]. 
 
Although uncommon, animals that cannot produce ‘good data’ despite 
‘encouragement’ are removed from study samples. As a research technician explains, 
if the animals are not able to perform prior to the intervention they are not put through 
surgery and do not become a disease model. 
 
‘Either you try and encourage them a bit to do the tests or if they really won't 
do anything you just have to leave them out at the end of the day.  What you 
normally do is test them prior to having a lesion.  If they won't do anything 
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then you leave them out at that stage and you don't put them through the 
surgery and that kind of thing’ [Ms Johnson: Cell-lab]. 
 
Nevertheless, this does not completely solve the problem of whether a poor 
experimental performance by a rodent following the insertion of a lesion is the result 
of the surgical intervention or simply an “off” day for the rodent. 
 
To establish the continuity of experimentation it is therefore essential to have a stock 
of mice with the same genetic pattern. However, successive breeding can cause 
deterioration in the familial line, with progressive litters of mice becoming ‘sicker and 
sicker’. The result is that the stock of mice may be too sick or die before an experiment 
can be run. A post-doc at TransLab explains the difficult balance between having a 
stock of mice with the ‘correct’ amount of features that approximate disease, and being 
able to run a successful experiment: 
 
‘Experiment-wise my main restriction is my animals. You know about my sick 
animals, that we have our knock-down mice that are very small and have no 
hair, and they die very quickly. So my work is kind of restricted as to how 
many of them are alive at the time of the experiment, or I have to plan my 
weeks around when they are born and when they will be used…So that’s a big 
influence…They were too young last week [to carry out the experiment], they 
would be ideal this week but they’re dead. We never used to lose them this 
early, we were losing them at just before four weeks, but now they are dying at 
three weeks and they’re not back crossed anymore’ [Dr Harold: TransLab]. 
 
 
Here we have an example of how scientists need to construct a good enough, robust 
model. There is a danger in going too far: although increased molecular manipulation 
may be a closer representation of the disease, the mice can become too sick to function 
as a working model. 
 
A workable model does not, therefore, retain all potentially relevant features. Although 
visual evidence can be matched in the model organisms, other aspects do not 
necessarily correspond. Induced disease in rodents, for instance, may not retain the 
developmental nature of medical conditions in humans: 
 
‘I suppose the only downside of some of the models we use is quite often we 
use them, start off with a healthy animal and we give it a lesion and then it 
immediately becomes unhealthy, immediately has a disease, whereas it 
generally progresses in humans and patients’ [Ms Whaling: Cell-lab]. 
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When modelling neurodegenerative disorders, there is limited success in replicating 
the degenerative nature of human disease or how the diseased human interacts with 
their social environment. The dependence on experimentation means that the 
environment and temporal development may be stripped out.  
 
Finally, the adequacy of a disease model depends on the description of the disease. It is 
not just the animal that is the model – it is also the disease category, which is itself an 
ideal-type. Researchers therefore need to determine what counts as the essential 
features of the disease itself. The process of calibration therefore is not a one-way 
process. In order to generate adequate, standardised models, the human medical 
condition itself requires calibration. If the model is intended to replicate the disease, 
then the disease also requires standardisation. This is from Cell-lab: 
 
‘Professor Endacott presents a split slideshow. On the left are some rodent 
behavioural tests being performed in the laboratory. While on the right of the 
screen are HD patients performing similar tests in the clinic. He explains how 
the behavioural tests performed in the laboratory have influenced the 
behavioural tests in the clinic’ [Fieldnotes]. 
 
The switch from human HD to rodent HD is apparently as smooth as the switch 
between rodent HD and human HD. The same is true for RTT: the representativeness 
of the mouse-models used within this field was never called into question at 
conferences and it was common for speakers to seamlessly switch between the 
description of their mouse-models and the child with RTT. An example is given below 
where throughout her presentation, a Japanese clinical expert described by a delegate 
as ‘the Japanese Rett queen’ switched fluidly between the animal and child. She 
repeatedly emphasised that the knock-out mice she used had clinical and behavioral 
features of the syndrome that were ‘similar to the girls’; the mouse ‘replicates’ the 
syndrome. 
 
‘“We are looking at the hippocampus and neuron developments in the brain of 
mecp2-null mice”. She describes the clinical features of the mice without 
MECP2 as displaying key clinical features to girls with the syndrome “these 
mice are similar to the girls, at 3-5 weeks they are pre-symptomatic, at 6-9 
weeks they are symptomatic, clasping, ataxia, seizure like behavior. So the 
mecp2 mouse behaviorally replicates the delayed onset and symptoms 
observed in human patients”’ [Fieldnotes]. 
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The reflexive relationship between rodent and human therefore not only redefines the 
disease it can also become the disease. 
 
Discussion 
 
The problem for all modellers is equivalent to the phenomenon of experimental regress 
(Collins 1985). We cannot know if an experiment is appropriately designed and 
conducted until it yields ‘the right’ results; yet we simultaneously use those 
experiments to derive the results in the first place. In the same way, scientists cannot 
know how good a model is until it predicts the ‘right’ outcome, but cannot know the 
right outcome in the absence of accurate models. Like all problems of regress (Collins 
1985; Stephens, Lewis and Atkinson in press), it reflects the fact that in practice there 
cannot be a gold-standard that is independent of the procedures used to make 
observations, measurements, predictions, or estimates.  Consequently, when we turn to 
the use of animal models in medical research, we encounter precisely the same issues. 
Scientists are confronted with making decisions concerning the adequacy of the model 
itself, the interpretation of their results, and their extrapolation to the target medical 
condition.  
 
In practice, regress is not a matter of anxiety or uncertainty on the part of scientists. 
Practical scientific work rests on the good-enough principle. Animal models do not 
have to be perfect. They are selected because they furnish more-or-less adequate 
representations of certain key features. Judgments of adequacy depend on disciplinary 
preferences and local cultures, as well as the specific research problem at hand. 
Therefore, if animal models are pervasive in contemporary biomedical research, so too 
are the judgments that inform their choice and use. We have stressed how the choice of 
animal species reflects both practical and representational issues. Mice and rats 
provide complementary experimental opportunities, as well as furnishing different 
practical affordances. But their relevance for the specific medical conditions under 
investigation is not a given. It rests on further processes of judgment and practical 
action in the laboratory. The scientists need to adjudicate whether and how the lab-
animal adequately represents specific features of the target disease in humans, and 
therefore whether the model is good-enough for all practical purposes. As we have 
also shown, this is not a simple, one-way process. The key features of the disease itself 
have to be aligned with symptomatic and behavioural features of the rodent model. 
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i Calibration is a type of comparison between measurements, one of known correctness and another 
made in as similar a way as possible to the first. 
ii All scientist’s names are pseudonyms. 
iii Bench scientists could be said to be bannistered (both guided and constrained) by the traditional 
preferences of their laboratory. 
